On North Korea: Optimistic, but Skeptical.

When I was in Seoul this past fall for a study abroad session, the atmosphere surrounding their northern counterpart was tense. Professors and study abroad advisors alike all gave the same justifications for safety during our time there: "North Korea wants reunification, they would never bomb Seoul directly", or "Their missile capabilities have gotten to a point where very few places in the world are safe from an attack." I personally know a few other students who have had to convince their parents that studying abroad in Seoul would be a safe choice. With each missile test in the fall, more reminders were given to us - that the subway stations doubled as bomb shelters, or to sign up for free text and email updates from a security company so that we would be updated if a missile did look like it was coming for us. But now, it looks like that fear could be a thing of the past. 

For those of you aren't aware already, South Korean President Moon Jae-in and Democratic People's Republic of Korea Chairman Kim Jong-un have signed a declaration announcing their intent to come to a peace treaty, officially ending the Korean War (It is a pretty common misconception that the Korean War has already ended, but they've just been under an armistice agreement since 1953). Obviously, we want this all to work out in exactly the way it is described in the declaration, but I'm not convinced that Kim Jong-un and Pyongyang are sincere about the terms of the declaration.

But first, read through Nicholas Kristof's (@nickkristof) opinion on the New York Times about understanding the situation and historical precedence - a great piece and thoroughly explains why we should be cautious in approaching the recent events. From there, it's easier for me to discuss the theory behind some of these pitfalls.

Can we trust North Korea to really uphold the values outlined in the declaration?

Fool me once, shame on me; fool me twice, shame on you. If I am going to believe that North Korea genuinely wants to end the war and reunite peacefully, there has to be some kind of concessions involved - some kind of signal or commitment that goes further than anything that North Korea has done before. The type of concessions that Kristof writes about is not enough - release of American detainees, stopping nuclear and missile testing, stopping production of plutonium. When you think about the larger picture, these are inconsequential - there will always be more foreign detainees and production/testing can always start up again. It is understandable to take the declaration at face value when the only other options are conflict, but let's not settle on a commitment to true peace in the peninsula. North Korea would have to be willing to give up a little bit of their power for the signal to be credible. Maybe when the details are worked out, North Korea would be willing to submit to frequent independent inspections on nuclear facilities (unlike the last time, where inspectors were not allowed to do their job or North Korea found excuses for breaking the rules), or something along those lines.

One could also argue that the entire scripted scenario and the act of making the declaration and agreeing to the summit is a credible signal - after all, the entire world is able to hold Kim Jong-un to his word on these promises. However, we have to remember that the Kim regime is based on the persuasion of the North Koreans, whose information comes from state controlled media outlets. North Korea's entire context is one of the underdog, a country that has been colonized and used by some of these world powers - a victim that has not been able to recover from the scars of colonialism. This victim complex is exactly what will save North Korea if agreements turn sour.

The most pressing issue is the denuclearization of the Peninsula - interpreted as both North Korean and American missiles in South Korea. North Korea is unlikely to give up their nuclear weapons. In their narrative, the nuclearization of North Korea is all that stands between them and vultures of the international community who seek to destroy their way of life. But without the denuclearization of North Korea, the United States would be reluctant to give up their nuclear and missile defense systems installed in South Korea - a classic case of the security dilemma. If negotiations fall through due to this reason, Kim Jong-un can fall back as the victim - harassing a smaller country to give up the only protection they have. Domestically, he can further legitimize his rule by claiming that he "tried, but unfortunately, the other leaders would not understand the struggles of the DPRK". For the international theorists out there, he is able to lower his audience costs without giving up anything in return.

It's not all bad.

The way I view the solution is through the social aspects of the declaration, rather than the militaristic. There was an idea that the way to win the war (minus a peace treaty) was through a regime change. In order to enact this regime change, some thinkers proposed that we challenge the North Korea propaganda about the heightened status of both its leader and its social quality of life. If the negotiations are restricted, and the reconnection of North and South Korea are not contingent on any other issue (looking at you, nuclear weapons), then there is a possibility for real change. The dissemination of information across the border would allow the North Koreans to challenge the information given to them by the regime and realize that their quality of life is not as great as it should be. Eventually, the goal would be a regime change, whether peaceful or through revolution, that would eventually lead to a leader that is willing to integrate harmoniously with the world.

From the perspective of Moon Jae-in and the rest of the world, there is no other choice for now but to take the words of Kim Jong-un at face value. It may not seem like it from the article, but I am an optimist, and real lasting peace is definitely attainable. This may just be the beginning of it.